The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. A platoon from Company D, 1/26 Marines was sent from the base but was withdrawn in the face of the superior PAVN forces. In 1970, the Office of Air Force History published a then "top secret", but now declassified, 106-page report, titled The Air Force in Southeast Asia: Toward a Bombing Halt, 1968. During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh by Murphy, Edward F. (mass_market) at the best online prices at eBay! Had the plane been shot down departing Khe Sanh, the casualties would have been counted. The 324th Division was located in the DMZ area 1015 miles (1624km) north of Khe Sanh while the 320th Division was within easy reinforcing distance to the northeast. Marines remained around Hill 689, though, and fighting in the vicinity continued until 11 July until they were finally withdrawn, bringing the battle to a close. The distinctions between Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II, while important from the command perspective, were not necessarily apparent to individual Marines. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their allies against the North Vietnamese Army. American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. [157], Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. According to Ray Stubbe, a U.S. Navy chaplain during the siege and since then the most significant Khe Sanh historian, the 205 figure is taken only from the records of the 26th Marine Regiment. The fact that the North Vietnamese committed only about half of their available forces to the offensive (6070,000), most of whom were Viet Cong, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. Let me caution everyone not to be confused. They produced a body count ratio in the range between 50:1 and 75:1. [85] Westmoreland had given his deputy commander for air operations, Air Force General William W. Momyer, the responsibility for coordinating all air assets during the operation to support KSCB. The Battle of Khe Sanh began on January 21, 1968, when forces from the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) carried out a massive artillery bombardment on the U.S. Marine garrison at Khe Sanh, located in South Vietnam near the border with Laos. [66] Hours after the bombardment ceased, the base was still in danger. [94] Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance. The Battle of Khe Sanh's initial action cost the Marines 12 killed, 17 wounded and two missing. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus. [151] From 12 June to 6 July 1969, Task Force Guadalcanal comprising 1/9 Marines, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment and 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd ARVN Regiment occupied the Khe Sanh area in Operation Utah Mesa. The enemy by my count suffered at least 15,000 dead in the area.. [79] On an average day, 350 tactical fighter-bombers, 60 B-52s, and 30 light observation or reconnaissance aircraft operated in the skies near the base. The combat losses in February and March 1967 were a prelude to the "First Battle of Khe Sanh," one of the Vietnam War's hardest-fought battles, . The Laotians were overrun, and many fled to the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Battle of Hamburger Hill The 29 th North Vietnam Army had entrenched themselves on Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam; a joint US-South Vietnamese force was ordered to remove them. The badly-deteriorated Route 9 ran from the coastal region through the western highlands and crossed the border into Laos. 239240. By the end of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. This time period does not particularly coincide with the fighting; rather, it dates from before the siege began and terminates before the siege (and the fighting) ended. Operation Pegasus casualties included 59 U.S. Army and 51 Marine Corps dead. This fighting was heavy, involving South Vietnamese militia as well as U.S. Army MACV advisers and Marines attached to a Combined Action Company platoon. However, North Vietnamese sources claim that the Americans did not win a victory at Khe Sanh but were forced to retreat to avoid destruction. [1] He goes on to state that a further 72 were killed as part Operation Scotland II throughout the remainder of the year, but that these deaths are not included in the official US casualty lists for the Battle of Khe Sanh. That was superseded by the smaller contingency plans. "[162] Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists for Hanoi to commit so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for the Tet Offensive. Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. [39], On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of an unknown size north of Hill 861. [93] At 18:10 hours, the PAVN followed up their morning mortar attack with an artillery strike from 152mm howitzers, firing 60 rounds into the camp. Two Marines died. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation. The Battle of Khe Sanh began Jan. 21, 1968, with inconclusive ground activity by US and North Vietnamese patrols. At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors. During one 8-hour period, the base was rocked by 1,307 rounds, most of which came from 130-mm (used for the first time on the battlefield) and 152-mm artillery pieces located in Laos. A 77 day battle, Khe Sanh had been the biggest single battle of the Vietnam War to that point. [1], The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie. It was a bad beginning to a long 77-day siege. [135] The Marines had constantly argued that technically, Khe Sanh had never been under siege, since it had never truly been isolated from resupply or reinforcement. Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment. A press release prepared on the following day (but never issued), at the height of Tet, showed that he was not about to be distracted. [34] US intelligence estimated between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN troops were killed, and 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and ARVN Airborne elements were killed in action, but three of the four battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat-ineffective during the battle. [165], Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle, a strategy that has come to be known as the Option Play. [83] Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering what those consequences could be: a political disaster. Two further attacks later in the morning were halted before the PAVN finally withdrew. [57][58] They were assisted in their emplacement efforts by the continuing bad weather of the winter monsoon. This is also the position taken in the official PAVN history but offers no further explanation of the strategy. The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base. For most of the battle, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon, and poor visibility severely hampered aerial resupply. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft. These forces, including support troops, totaled 20,000 to 30,000. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. [40] The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Seymoe and other soldiers died when their helicopter was attacked. The Battle of Ban Houei Sane, not the attack three weeks later at Lang Vei, marked the first time that the PAVN had committed an armored unit to battle. [123][124], Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. Reinforcements from the ARVN 256th Regional Force (RF) company were dispatched aboard nine UH-1 helicopters of the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, but they were landed near the abandoned French fort/former FOB-3 which was occupied by the PAVN who killed many of the RF troops and 4 Americans, including Lieutenant colonel Joseph Seymoe the deputy adviser for Quang Tri Province and forcing the remaining helicopters to abandon the mission. [25], Marino stated that "by 1966, Westmoreland had begun to consider Khe Sanh as part of a larger strategy." Even so, Westmoreland insisted for it not only to be occupied by the Marines but also for it to be reinforced. In an unconventional war without conventional frontlines, statistics became the most critical measure of progress. [170][140], One argument that was then leveled by Westmoreland and has since often quoted by historians of the battle is that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh, compared with the several PAVN divisions. From the Hu site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. This is the battles end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. Stubbe examined the command chronologies of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 26th Marines, plus the after-action reports of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and more than one dozen other units, all present at Khe Sanh under 26th Marine operational control. A historian, General Dave Palmer, accepted that rationale: "General Giap never had any intention of capturing Khe Sanh [it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. [69] The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. The PAVN forces were in the process of gaining elevated terrain before it launched the main attack. Early in the war US forces had established a garrison at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri province, in the . On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of command to CINCPAC in Honolulu. The official North Vietnamese history claimed that 400 South Vietnamese troops had been killed and 253 captured. [142], Lownds and the 26th Marines departed Khe Sanh, leaving the defense of the base to the 1st Marine Regiment. [20] These figures do not include casualties among Special Forces troops at Lang Vei, aircrews killed or missing in the area, or Marine replacements killed or wounded while entering or exiting the base aboard aircraft. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. [12] Further fighting followed, resulting in the loss of another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers, before the Marines finally withdrew from the area on 11 July. [146] Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. GitHub export from English Wikipedia. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. The Operation Scotland tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was limited to the area around Khe Sanh along Route 9 in western Quang Tri province. Lima Company finally seized the hill after overcoming determined NVA resistance. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. 20,000-30,000 men Battle of Khe Sanh Overview today! [140] Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. PAVN forces were driven out of the area around Khe Sanh after suffering 940 casualties. Senior Marine Corps General Victor Krulak agreed, noting on May 13 that the Marines had defeated the North Vietnamese and won the battle of Khe Sanh. Over time, these KIA figures have been accepted by historians. [166] This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay. A limited attack was made by a PAVN company on 1 July, falling on a company from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, who were holding a position 3km to the southeast of the base. The Marines withdrew all salvageable material and destroyed everything else. He believed that was proved by the PAVN's actions during Tet. Many American casualties were caused by the 10,908 rounds of rockets, artillery and mortars the North Vietnamese fired into the base and hill positions. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11 wounded. At 1530 hours the first C-123, with 44 passengers and a crew of five, began to land. The fire of PAVN antiaircraft units took its toll of helicopters that made the attempt. . The tower at Khe Sanh instructed the pilot to take evasive action and go around for another approach. Ten American soldiers were killed; the rest managed to escape down Route 9 to Khe Sanh. MN: 05-12-1968: Vietnam: Army: 2: [148], Regardless, the PAVN had gained control of a strategically important area, and its lines of communication extended further into South Vietnam. The official, public estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese KIA stands in contrast to another estimate made by the American military. [98] The Marines continued to oppose the operation until Westmoreland actually had to issue an order to Cushman to allow the rescue operation to proceed. 129131. A Look at the Damage from the Secret War in Laos, How Operation Homecoming Was Sprung into Action to Repatriate American POWs, The Viet Cong Were Shooting Down Americans From a Cave Until This GI Stopped Them, https://www.historynet.com/recounting-the-casualties-at-the-deadly-battle-of-khe-sanh/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. [77] When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. [27][28] The Marines' defensive system stretched below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the coast, along Route 9, to Khe Sanh. Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 (304th and 308th Division), Defense at Route 9: ~16,900 (320th and 324th Division), This page was last edited on 1 March 2023, at 15:52. On the morning of 22 January Lownds decided to evacuate the remaining forces in the village with most of the Americans evacuated by helicopter while two advisers led the surviving local forces overland to the combat base. The battle of Khe Sanh is one of the most well-known battles of the Vietnam War. "[28], As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all that he needed to know was that the PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. [59], Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. During the course of the siege, the U.S. Air Force dropped five tons of bombs for each of the estimated 20,000 attacking NVA troops. The Marines claimed 115 PAVN killed, while their own casualties amounted to 10 dead, 100 wounded, and two missing. [139] The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic on 11 April. [58] The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). [51] Other concerns raised included the assertion that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to Qung Tr City and other urban areas, a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration since PAVN troops could easily bypass Khe Sanh, the base was too isolated, and the Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations." This marked the first time that all three battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment had operated together in combat since the Battle of Iwo Jima during the Second World War. As journalist Robert Pisor pointed out in his 1982 book, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, no other battle of the entire war produced a better body count or kill ratio than that claimed by the Americans at Khe Sanh. Less likely to be mentioned is the final high-casualty engagement between units of the U.S. infantry and the North Vietnamese Army. Of the 7877 officer casualties, 7595 or 96.4% were white, 147 or 1.8% were black; 24 or . According to the official Marine Corps history of the battle, total fatalities for Operation Scotland were 205 friendly KIA. The Marines recorded an actual body count of 1,602 NVA killed but estimated the total NVA dead at between 10,000 and 15,000. Ray Stubbe has published a translation of the North Vietnamese history of the siege at Khe Sanh. [97] During a meeting at Da Nang at 07:00 the next morning, Westmoreland and Cushman accepted Lownds' decision. [54] In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. [53] Two divisions, the 304th and the 325th, were assigned to the operation: the 325th was given responsibility for the area around the north, while the 304th was given responsibility for the southern sector. In 1966, the regular Special Forces troops had moved off the plateau and built a smaller camp down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the Laotian border. On April 5, 1968, MACV prepared an Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle for General Westmoreland. The border battles, however, had two significant consequences, which were unappreciated at the time. It claimed, however, that only three American advisors were killed during the action. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazines book review editor.
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